The Australian
November 22, 2011 Tuesday

Dragon's rise sees Asia yearn for Uncle Sam

A US partnership is proving appealing

JOHN LEE

DURING the East Asian Summit over the weekend the leader of every member state, with the exception of China, Cambodia and Burma, joined the US President in urging a multilateral resolution of the South China Sea dispute. Although there are six countries involved in various disputes over maritime borders, China's claim is by far the most extensive and aggressively defended. Given its longstanding demand that its disputes with other Southeast Asian nations be resolved bilaterally -- thereby excluding the participation of the US and maximising China's capacity to intimidate smaller claimants -- this was a significant tactical defeat for Beijing.

In light of the apparent enthusiasm for a Trans-Pacific Partnership free-trade agreement that excludes China, the announcement of US troops on Australian soil and the EAS, China has had better days. The significance of these events is the confirmation that the US security role in Asia will strengthen, and China's decade-old strategy to weaken it and its security relationships in the region is failing.

There are two sides to the coin: the growing concern about China's rise and the renewed regional embrace of a strong and engaged America.

Few countries in the region want to needlessly poke China in the eye. But to Beijing's dismay, every major country in Asia -- Japan, South Korea, The Philippines, Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and India -- has called for a renewed US commitment in the region and reinforced or improved strategic relations with Washington over the past two years. This does not mean basing American troops on their soil in every instance but it does mean greater and more meaningful strategic co-operation and an entrenched American presence in the Indo-Pacific.

Despite talk of anti-piracy and disaster relief, the open secret throughout the region is that much of this is about China. So why the deepening concerns about China's rise despite its emergence as the leading trading partner for US security allies and partners such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, Singapore and India? Here are three reasons.

First, China's military spending has increased faster than its already spectacular gross domestic product growth for the past 20 years. This has occurred regardless of whether its relationship with the US and regional powers is improving or deteriorating. Indeed, China's borders and maritime surrounds over the past three decades have been the most stable for the past century. There has been a period of uninterrupted peace for 35 years in the region. In fact, China's increased military spending is the most rapid of any country during peacetime in living memory. Second, it is becoming more difficult to accept China's military modernisation as solely designed to prevent Taiwanese independence, as is still the official line. While it is legitimate for any rising power to build capabilities to protect its interests, the lack of transparency as to what the People's Liberation Army is up to, and why, is naturally creating concern. The Chinese line that there can be no transparency until there is trust turns the traditional logic of the utility of transparency on its head.

Third, as China grows richer, it is becoming more, rather than less, assertive. Note the intensification of its claims over four-fifths of the South China Sea or the basing of 250,000 troops just north of the Indian-held territory of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims. History tells us that this should have been expected. But governments vainly hoping that China could be different have been forced to respond. The rise of continental giants tends to trigger a coalition among maritime powers over time. The only effective check on Chinese might is American power. And the US Seventh Fleet has provided maritime security and stability for trade to thrive throughout the region over six decades. But there are other reasons why almost all regional states prefer American primacy to any other in Asia.

The US is the only major power that does not have border or maritime disputes with an Asian country. The same cannot be said of China, Japan, India and possibly South Korea.

This leads to a related and apparent paradox. The fact that the US is not geographically based in Asia works to its advantage. As a foreign leader, it requires greater levels of acquiescence from Asian partners to retain its presence in the region (such as basing rights). If asked to shift its bases, as occurred in The Philippines in 1992, the US will do so peacefully. Even if there was resentment in Washington, the US was in no position to punish Manila. In contrast, a dominant Asian power would not need the same level of regional acquiescence to maintain its military footholds. The US has to constantly negotiate the terms of its presence in Asia and is structurally bound to provide public security goods. There would be much less incentive for a dominant Asian power such as China to do so.

The strategic headwinds confronting a Chinese-dominated ``Asian century'' are considerable. This is combined with the reality that the most lucrative and important sectors of China's domestic market is largely closed to outsiders, which serves to limit the economic leverage it can exercise. The consensus is that adroit diplomacy allowed China to ``eat America's lunch'' in Asia. We now know that a Chinese diplomatic charm offensive has reached its limits and is no longer enough.

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>> John Lee is the Michael Hintze fellow for Energy Security and adjunct professor at the Centre for International Security Studies, Sydney University, and a non-resident scholar at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC